On the Economics of Contribution Evasion

Publikationstyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
Autor/innen: Friehe, Tim; Baumann, Florian; Jansen, Marcus
Erscheinungsjahr: 2009
Erschienen in: FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis ; 65 (2009), 2. - S. 162-177
Schriftenreihe: Working Paper Series / Chair of Comparative Public Policy and Administration ; 65
DOI (zitierfähiger Link): https://dx.doi.org/10.1628/001522109X466509
Zusammenfassung:
This paper considers the tax evasion decision when taxes constitute contributions to the financing of social insurance programs, such as un employment insurance. We call this evasion contribution evasion and establish that critical differences exist between contribution evasion and tax evasion, the central difference being that contributions entitle the contributor to future claims. Furthermore, we derive a recomme ndation for the reduction of contribution evasion, referring to the distinction between Bismarckian and Beveridgean social security systems.
JEL-Klassifikation: H 21; H 23
Fachgebiet (DDC): 330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter: Economics, Contribution, Evasion
Link zur Lizenz: Deposit-Lizenz
Universitätsbibliographie: Ja

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FRIEHE, Tim, Florian BAUMANN, Marcus JANSEN, 2009. On the Economics of Contribution Evasion. In: FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis. 65(2), pp. 162-177

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