On the Evasion of Employment Protection Legislation

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BAUMANN, Florian, Tim FRIEHE, 2012. On the Evasion of Employment Protection Legislation. In: Labour Economics. 19(1), pp. 9-17. ISSN 0927-5371. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2011.06.005

@article{Baumann2012Evasi-17791, title={On the Evasion of Employment Protection Legislation}, year={2012}, doi={10.1016/j.labeco.2011.06.005}, number={1}, volume={19}, issn={0927-5371}, journal={Labour Economics}, pages={9--17}, author={Baumann, Florian and Friehe, Tim} }

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