Type of Publication: | Journal article |
Author: | Friehe, Tim; Endres, Alfred |
Year of publication: | 2012 |
Published in: | Land Economics ; 88 (2012), 1. - pp. 121-138 |
Summary: |
This paper analyzes the output and abatement choices of perfectly competitive downstream polluters who are subject to environmental liability law and procure abatement from an imperfectly competitive eco-industry. Under strict liability, polluting firms choose suboptimal abatement, but socially optimal output given abatement. Under negligence with firm-specific abatement standards, polluting firms choose suboptimal output but socially optimal abatement given output. Under negligence with industry-wide abatement standards, the output and abatement choices of most firms are socially suboptimal. Second-best considerations are offered for each case. Under strict liability (negligence), these apply to the level of liability (the behavioral standard).
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JEL Classification: | H23, Q58 |
Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
Bibliography of Konstanz: | Yes |
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FRIEHE, Tim, Alfred ENDRES, 2012. Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law. In: Land Economics. 88(1), pp. 121-138
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