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Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law

Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law

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FRIEHE, Tim, Alfred ENDRES, 2012. Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law. In: Land Economics. 88(1), pp. 121-138

@article{Friehe2012Marke-17789, title={Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law}, year={2012}, number={1}, volume={88}, journal={Land Economics}, pages={121--138}, author={Friehe, Tim and Endres, Alfred} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/17789"> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper analyzes the output and abatement choices of perfectly competitive downstream polluters who are subject to environmental liability law and procure abatement from an imperfectly competitive eco-industry. Under strict liability, polluting firms choose suboptimal abatement, but socially optimal output given abatement. Under negligence with firm-specific abatement standards, polluting firms choose suboptimal output but socially optimal abatement given output. Under negligence with industry-wide abatement standards, the output and abatement choices of most firms are socially suboptimal. Second-best considerations are offered for each case. Under strict liability (negligence), these apply to the level of liability (the behavioral standard).</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dc:contributor>Endres, Alfred</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Friehe, Tim</dc:creator> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Publ. in: Land Economics ; 88 (2012), 1. - S. 121-138</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-01-19T12:23:45Z</dc:date> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dc:contributor>Friehe, Tim</dc:contributor> <dcterms:title>Market Power in the Eco-Industry : Polluters' Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law</dcterms:title> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/17789"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-01-19T12:23:45Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:creator>Endres, Alfred</dc:creator> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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