A Note on the Optimality of (Even More) Incomplete Strict Liability


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BAUMANN, Florian, Tim FRIEHE, Kristoffel GRECHENIG, 2011. A Note on the Optimality of (Even More) Incomplete Strict Liability. In: International Review of Law and Economics. 31(2), pp. 77-82. ISSN 0144-8188

@article{Baumann2011Optim-17786, title={A Note on the Optimality of (Even More) Incomplete Strict Liability}, year={2011}, doi={10.1016/j.irle.2011.01.004}, number={2}, volume={31}, issn={0144-8188}, journal={International Review of Law and Economics}, pages={77--82}, author={Baumann, Florian and Friehe, Tim and Grechenig, Kristoffel} }

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