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Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law

Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law

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ENDRES, Alfred, Tim FRIEHE, 2011. Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law. In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 62(1), pp. 30-40. ISSN 0095-0696. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2010.12.001

@article{Endres2011Incen-17785, title={Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law}, year={2011}, doi={10.1016/j.jeem.2010.12.001}, number={1}, volume={62}, issn={0095-0696}, journal={Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, pages={30--40}, author={Endres, Alfred and Friehe, Tim} }

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