KOPS - Das Institutionelle Repositorium der Universität Konstanz

R&D and Abatement Under Environmental Liability Law : Comparing Incentives Under Strict Liability and Negligence if Compensation Differs from Harm

R&D and Abatement Under Environmental Liability Law : Comparing Incentives Under Strict Liability and Negligence if Compensation Differs from Harm

Zitieren

Dateien zu dieser Ressource

Dateien Größe Format Anzeige

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

ENDRES, Alfred, Tim FRIEHE, 2011. R&D and Abatement Under Environmental Liability Law : Comparing Incentives Under Strict Liability and Negligence if Compensation Differs from Harm. In: Energy Economics. 33(3), pp. 419-425. ISSN 0140-9883

@article{Endres2011Abate-17782, title={R&D and Abatement Under Environmental Liability Law : Comparing Incentives Under Strict Liability and Negligence if Compensation Differs from Harm}, year={2011}, doi={10.1016/j.eneco.2010.11.001}, number={3}, volume={33}, issn={0140-9883}, journal={Energy Economics}, pages={419--425}, author={Endres, Alfred and Friehe, Tim} }

Endres, Alfred R&D and Abatement Under Environmental Liability Law : Comparing Incentives Under Strict Liability and Negligence if Compensation Differs from Harm Endres, Alfred deposit-license 2012-01-19T12:45:34Z 2012-01-19T12:45:34Z 2011 Friehe, Tim Friehe, Tim Publ. in: Energy Economics ; 33 (2011), 3. - S. 419–425 eng This paper analyzes equilibrium R&D in pollution control and equilibrium pollution abatement by polluters who are subject to environmental liability law when the level of compensation differs from the level of environmental harm. We contrast the performance of strict liability with that of the negligence rule. Privately optimal levels necessarily deviate from socially optimal ones under strict liability, whereas private decisions are first-best under negligence unless compensation is much smaller than harm. It is established that the way in which privately optimal R&D deviates from the first-best level depends on the kind of technical change in pollution abatement. Counterintuitively polluters might overinvest into R&D in pollution control if compensation falls short of harm, and may underinvest if compensation exceeds harm.

Das Dokument erscheint in:

KOPS Suche


Stöbern

Mein Benutzerkonto