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Correlated Payoffs in the Inspection Game : Some Theory and an Application to Corruption

Correlated Payoffs in the Inspection Game : Some Theory and an Application to Corruption

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FRIEHE, Tim, 2008. Correlated Payoffs in the Inspection Game : Some Theory and an Application to Corruption. In: Public Choice. 137(1/2), pp. 127-143

@article{Friehe2008Corre-1778, title={Correlated Payoffs in the Inspection Game : Some Theory and an Application to Corruption}, year={2008}, doi={10.1007/s11127-008-9317-7}, number={1/2}, volume={137}, journal={Public Choice}, pages={127--143}, author={Friehe, Tim} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/1778"> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:35:54Z</dc:date> <dc:contributor>Friehe, Tim</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Friehe, Tim</dc:creator> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/1778"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103416863-3868037-7"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The inspection game as formulated by Tsebelis (Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83:77 91, 1989) has the counterintuitive implication that crime is unaffected by the magnitude of the penalty. This paper demonstrates that to attain this outcome, it is necessary to assume independence of enforcer and offender payoffs. Given correlated payoffs, the comparative statics of the equilibrium yield an inverse relationship between crime and the severity of the sanction. In an application, we enrich the framework of Tsebelis by adding corruption stages and show that this can imply such a correlation of payoffs. Another interesting finding is that harsher anticorruption measures can increase crime incentives.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:issued>2008</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:35:54Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:title>Correlated Payoffs in the Inspection Game : Some Theory and an Application to Corruption</dcterms:title> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Publ. in: Public Choice 137 (2008), 1/2, pp. 127-143</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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