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Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

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KOCHAN, Jeff, 2008. Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 22(1), pp. 21-38. ISSN 0269-8595. Available under: doi: 10.1080/02698590802280878

@article{Kochan2008Reali-17207, title={Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge}, year={2008}, doi={10.1080/02698590802280878}, number={1}, volume={22}, issn={0269-8595}, journal={International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, pages={21--38}, author={Kochan, Jeff} }

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