Minimizing the losers : Regime satisfaction in multi-level systems

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HOLZINGER, Katharina, Andrea SCHNEIDER, Klaus W. ZIMMERMANN, 2011. Minimizing the losers : Regime satisfaction in multi-level systems. In: Constitutional Political Economy. 22(4), pp. 303-324. ISSN 1043-4062. eISSN 1572-9966

@article{Holzinger2011Minim-16878, title={Minimizing the losers : Regime satisfaction in multi-level systems}, year={2011}, doi={10.1007/s10602-011-9107-y}, number={4}, volume={22}, issn={1043-4062}, journal={Constitutional Political Economy}, pages={303--324}, author={Holzinger, Katharina and Schneider, Andrea and Zimmermann, Klaus W.} }

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