The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior

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ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Ana B. ANIA, 2005. The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior. In: Economic Theory. 26(3), pp. 497-516. ISSN 0938-2259. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8

@article{AlosFerrer2005evolu-16709, title={The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior}, year={2005}, doi={10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8}, number={3}, volume={26}, issn={0938-2259}, journal={Economic Theory}, pages={497--516}, author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Ania, Ana B.} }

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