## Driving forces behind informal sanctions

No Thumbnail Available
##### Files
There are no files associated with this item.
2005
Falk, Armin
Fehr, Ernst
Journal article
##### Published in
Econometrica ; 73 (2005), 6. - pp. 2017-2030. - ISSN 0012-9682
##### Abstract
This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted toward the defectors, but the latter also impose a considerable amount of spiteful punishment on the cooperators. However, spiteful punishment vanishes if the punishers can no longer affect the payoff differences between themselves and the punished individual, whereas the cooperators even increase the resources devoted to punishment in this case. Our data also discriminate between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own payoff to the group's average or the group's total payoff cannot explain the fact that cooperators target their punishment at the defectors. Fairness theories that assume that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that cooperators punish defectors even if payoff inequalities cannot be reduced. Therefore, retaliation, i.e., the desire to harm those who committed unfair acts, seems to be the most important motive behind fairness-driven informal sanctions.
330 Economics
##### Keywords
Sanctioning,cooperation,social norm,reciprocity,fairness,spitefulness
##### Cite This
ISO 690FALK, Armin, Ernst FEHR, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2005. Driving forces behind informal sanctions. In: Econometrica. 73(6), pp. 2017-2030. ISSN 0012-9682. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x
BibTex
@article{Falk2005Drivi-16668,
year={2005},
doi={10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x},
title={Driving forces behind informal sanctions},
number={6},
volume={73},
issn={0012-9682},
journal={Econometrica},
pages={2017--2030},
author={Falk, Armin and Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs}
}

RDF
<rdf:RDF
xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted toward the defectors, but the latter also impose a considerable amount of spiteful punishment on the cooperators. However, spiteful punishment vanishes if the punishers can no longer affect the payoff differences between themselves and the punished individual, whereas the cooperators even increase the resources devoted to punishment in this case. Our data also discriminate between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own payoff to the group's average or the group's total payoff cannot explain the fact that cooperators target their punishment at the defectors. Fairness theories that assume that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that cooperators punish defectors even if payoff inequalities cannot be reduced. Therefore, retaliation, i.e., the desire to harm those who committed unfair acts, seems to be the most important motive behind fairness-driven informal sanctions.</dcterms:abstract>
<dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-11-16T05:59:48Z</dcterms:available>
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<dc:contributor>Falk, Armin</dc:contributor>
<dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
<dc:creator>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:creator>
<bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/16668"/>
<dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
<foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
<dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-11-16T05:59:48Z</dc:date>
<void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
<dc:creator>Fehr, Ernst</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Falk, Armin</dc:creator>
<dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Publ. in: Econometrica ; 73 (2005), 6. - S. 2017–2030</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
<dc:contributor>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:contributor>
<dcterms:title>Driving forces behind informal sanctions</dcterms:title>
<dc:contributor>Fehr, Ernst</dc:contributor>
<dcterms:issued>2005</dcterms:issued>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

No