On the intergenerational pareto efficiency of pay-as-you-go financed pension systems
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| Type of Publication: | Journal article |
| URI (citable link): | http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-166405 |
| Author: | Breyer, Friedrich |
| Year of publication: | 1989 |
| Published in: | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) ; 145 (1989), 4. - pp. 643-658 |
| Summary: |
When a pay-as-you-go financed public pension system is replaced by a funded system or by private savings, it is generally impossible to compensate the pensioners in the transition generation for the loss incurred without making at least one later generation worse off. This is shown in a standard one-sector overlapping-generations model, both for a "small" open and for a closed economy. Our findings imply that the choice between financing methods for social security can not be reduced to the intergenerational Pareto-criterion but necessarily involves distributional conflicts among generations.
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| Summary in another language: |
Beim Übergang von einem umlagefinanzierten staatlichen Rentensystem zu einem System mit Kapitaldeckung oder zu privater Alterssicherung ist es generell unmöglich, die erste betroffene Rentnergeneration für ihre Verluste zu kompensieren, ohne wenigstens eine der späteren Generationen schlechter zu stellen als im Umlageverfahren. Dies wird im Rahmen eines üblichen Ein-Sektoren-Modells mit überlappenden Generationen bewiesen, und zwar sowohl für eine "kleine" offene als auch fur eine geschlossene Volkswirtschaft. Diese Ergebnisse implizieren, daß die Auswahl zwischen verschiedenen Finanzierungsmethoden in der Alterssicherung nicht allein auf Überlegungen der intergenerationellen Pareto-Effizienz griinden kann, sondern daß sie notwendigerweise einen intergenerationellen Verteilungskonflikt in sich birgt.
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| Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
| Link to License: | In Copyright |
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BREYER, Friedrich, 1989. On the intergenerational pareto efficiency of pay-as-you-go financed pension systems. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE). 145(4), pp. 643-658
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