Incentives to retire later : A Solution to the social security crisis?

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BREYER, Friedrich, Mathias KIFMANN, 2002. Incentives to retire later : A Solution to the social security crisis?. In: Journal of Pension Economics and Finance. 1(02). ISSN 1474-7472

@article{Breyer2002Incen-16635, title={Incentives to retire later : A Solution to the social security crisis?}, year={2002}, doi={10.1017/S1474747202001075}, number={02}, volume={1}, issn={1474-7472}, journal={Journal of Pension Economics and Finance}, author={Breyer, Friedrich and Kifmann, Mathias} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/16635"> <dc:creator>Breyer, Friedrich</dc:creator> <dcterms:issued>2002</dcterms:issued> <dc:contributor>Breyer, Friedrich</dc:contributor> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/16635"/> <dcterms:title>Incentives to retire later : A Solution to the social security crisis?</dcterms:title> <dc:creator>Kifmann, Mathias</dc:creator> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Publ. in: Journal of Pension Economics and Finance ; 1 (2002), 2. - S. 111-130</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-11-09T10:11:38Z</dcterms:available> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-11-09T10:11:38Z</dc:date> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dc:contributor>Kifmann, Mathias</dc:contributor> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">As one possible solution to the well-known financing crisis of unfunded social security systems, an increase in the retirement age is a popular option. To induce workers to retire later, it has been proposed to strengthen the link between retirement age and benefit level. The present paper is devoted to analyzing the long-run financial implications of such a reform. We show that with actuarial adjustments the long-run contribution rate is an increasing function of the retirement age chosen by workers. Moreover, the implicit tax paid to the pension system by a participant can increase in the long run if the retirement age rises in response to a steep adjustment rule. In this sense, the proposed cure may worsen the disease. Finally, we show how the negative effects can be avoided by forming a capital stock from the additional revenues due to later retirement.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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