Path dependence in public-good games

Zitieren

Dateien zu dieser Ressource

Prüfsumme: MD5:1fffb94e8f092a886b0be0b8dbb3c360

BRUTTEL, Lisa, Tim FRIEHE, 2011. Path dependence in public-good games

@techreport{Bruttel2011depen-16204, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={Path dependence in public-good games}, year={2011}, number={67}, author={Bruttel, Lisa and Friehe, Tim} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/16204"> <dcterms:issued>2011</dcterms:issued> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-10-04T12:49:09Z</dc:date> <dc:contributor>Bruttel, Lisa</dc:contributor> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/16204"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:creator>Friehe, Tim</dc:creator> <dc:creator>Bruttel, Lisa</dc:creator> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:title>Path dependence in public-good games</dcterms:title> <dc:contributor>Friehe, Tim</dc:contributor> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/16204/1/TWI-RPS-067-Bruttel-Friehe-2011-08.pdf"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-10-04T12:49:09Z</dcterms:available> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/16204/1/TWI-RPS-067-Bruttel-Friehe-2011-08.pdf"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper presents experimental evidence that contributions to a public good can be path-dependent for a limited time span. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities. Our data shows that subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good contributions in rounds 1-10 contributed more to the public good in rounds 11 and 12, even though they faced the same marginal return as the control group in these later rounds. In contrast, differences in contributions were not significant when comparing subjects bearing the same current costs of punishment points, but having had different costs in the past.</dcterms:abstract> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Dateiabrufe seit 01.10.2014 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

TWI-RPS-067-Bruttel-Friehe-2011-08.pdf 147

Das Dokument erscheint in:

KOPS Suche


Stöbern

Mein Benutzerkonto