On the Nature of Reciprocity : Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure

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NICKLISCH, Andreas, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2011. On the Nature of Reciprocity : Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure

@techreport{Nicklisch2011Natur-15943, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={On the Nature of Reciprocity : Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure}, year={2011}, number={65}, author={Nicklisch, Andreas and Wolff, Irenaeus} }

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TWI-RPS-065-Nicklisch-Wolff-2011-06.pdf 154

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