Turnout and the (effective) number of parties at the national and district levels : A puzzle-solving approach

Lade...
Vorschaubild
Dateien
grofman_selb.pdf
grofman_selb.pdfGröße: 1.55 MBDownloads: 592
Datum
2010
Autor:innen
Grofman, Bernard
Herausgeber:innen
Kontakt
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
ArXiv-ID
Internationale Patentnummer
EU-Projektnummer
DFG-Projektnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung (Freitext)
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Gesperrt bis
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Forschungsvorhaben
Organisationseinheiten
Zeitschriftenheft
Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Party Politics. 2010, 17(1), pp. 93-117. ISSN 1354-0688. Available under: doi: 10.1177/1354068810365506
Zusammenfassung

Blais (2006) and Blais and Aarts (2006) in their review essays on voter turnout call attention to a striking puzzle about the link between electoral systems and turnout, namely that, ceteris paribus, proportional representation (PR) systems with many parties appear to have higher national-level turnout than single-member district (SMD) plurality systems with few parties, yet turnout does not increase with the (effective) number of parties (ENP) at the national level. To address this puzzle we turn to district-specific within-nation panel data from Switzerland and Spain. Our country-specific findings allow us to explain the national-level puzzle as essentially an ecological artefact, in that the multi-member districts found in proportional systems, on average, do exhibit higher turnout than SMDs, but turnout does not rise with district magnitude, m, once we move beyond the contrast between m = 1 and m > 1. Using a more sophisticated approach to measuring political competition that does not treat all PR systems as generating identical turnout incentives (Grofman and Selb, 2009), we seek to explain this puzzle by showing both empirically and theoretically that (1) proportionality does not necessarily increase with district magnitude, and (2) competition does not necessarily increase with district magnitude.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
320 Politik
Schlagwörter
disproportionality, district magnitude, effective number of parties, electoral systems, party competition, voter turnout
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690GROFMAN, Bernard, Peter SELB, 2010. Turnout and the (effective) number of parties at the national and district levels : A puzzle-solving approach. In: Party Politics. 2010, 17(1), pp. 93-117. ISSN 1354-0688. Available under: doi: 10.1177/1354068810365506
BibTex
@article{Grofman2010Turno-14476,
  year={2010},
  doi={10.1177/1354068810365506},
  title={Turnout and the (effective) number of parties at the national and district levels : A puzzle-solving approach},
  number={1},
  volume={17},
  issn={1354-0688},
  journal={Party Politics},
  pages={93--117},
  author={Grofman, Bernard and Selb, Peter}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/14476">
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Party Politics ; 17 (2011), 1. - S. 93-117</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
    <dcterms:issued>2010</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:contributor>Selb, Peter</dc:contributor>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/14476/1/grofman_selb.pdf"/>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/14476"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-01-31T23:25:14Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:creator>Selb, Peter</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Blais (2006) and Blais and Aarts (2006) in their review essays on voter turnout call attention to a striking puzzle about the link between electoral systems and turnout, namely that, ceteris paribus, proportional representation (PR) systems with many parties appear to have higher national-level turnout than single-member district (SMD) plurality systems with few parties, yet turnout does not increase with the (effective) number of parties (ENP) at the national level. To address this puzzle we turn to district-specific within-nation panel data from Switzerland and Spain. Our country-specific findings allow us to explain the national-level puzzle as essentially an ecological artefact, in that the multi-member districts found in proportional systems, on average, do exhibit higher turnout than SMDs, but turnout does not rise with district magnitude, m, once we move beyond the contrast between m = 1 and m &gt; 1. Using a more sophisticated approach to measuring political competition that does not treat all PR systems as generating identical turnout incentives (Grofman and Selb, 2009), we seek to explain this puzzle by showing both empirically and theoretically that (1) proportionality does not necessarily increase with district magnitude, and (2) competition does not necessarily increase with district magnitude.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:contributor>Grofman, Bernard</dc:contributor>
    <dc:creator>Grofman, Bernard</dc:creator>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-11-11T08:15:17Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:title>Turnout and the (effective) number of parties at the national and district levels : A puzzle-solving approach</dcterms:title>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/14476/1/grofman_selb.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.
Prüfdatum der URL
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen