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Tax Competition and Tax Co-operation in the EU : The Case of Savings Taxation

Tax Competition and Tax Co-operation in the EU : The Case of Savings Taxation

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HOLZINGER, Katharina, 2005. Tax Competition and Tax Co-operation in the EU : The Case of Savings Taxation. In: Rationality and Society. 17(4), pp. 475-510. ISSN 1043-4631. Available under: doi: 10.1177/1043463105058319

@article{Holzinger2005Compe-14153, title={Tax Competition and Tax Co-operation in the EU : The Case of Savings Taxation}, year={2005}, doi={10.1177/1043463105058319}, number={4}, volume={17}, issn={1043-4631}, journal={Rationality and Society}, pages={475--510}, author={Holzinger, Katharina} }

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