Voter uncertainty and failure of Duverger’s law : an empirical analysis


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HERRMANN, Michael, 2010. Voter uncertainty and failure of Duverger’s law : an empirical analysis. In: Public Choice. 151(1-2), pp. 63-90. ISSN 0048-5829. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-010-9734-2

@article{Herrmann2010Voter-14079, title={Voter uncertainty and failure of Duverger’s law : an empirical analysis}, year={2010}, doi={10.1007/s11127-010-9734-2}, number={1-2}, volume={151}, issn={0048-5829}, journal={Public Choice}, pages={63--90}, author={Herrmann, Michael} }

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