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Pension reform in Germany and Austria : system change vs. quantitative retrenchment

Pension reform in Germany and Austria : system change vs. quantitative retrenchment

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BUSEMEYER, Marius R., 2005. Pension reform in Germany and Austria : system change vs. quantitative retrenchment. In: West European Politics. 28(3), pp. 569-591. ISSN 0140-2382

@article{Busemeyer2005Pensi-13700, title={Pension reform in Germany and Austria : system change vs. quantitative retrenchment}, year={2005}, doi={10.1080/01402380500085830}, number={3}, volume={28}, issn={0140-2382}, journal={West European Politics}, pages={569--591}, author={Busemeyer, Marius R.} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/13700"> <dcterms:title>Pension reform in Germany and Austria : system change vs. quantitative retrenchment</dcterms:title> <dcterms:issued>2005</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This article first outlines the differences in outcome of pension reform in Germany and Austria. The 2001 German pension reform cut benefits very little, but it started a system changing transformation process by strengthening the second (occupational pensions) and third pillar (private pensions). The 2003 Austrian pension reform, pushed through against major opposition from the labour unions, contains very few elements of policy innovation, but benefits have been cut back much more significantly than in the German case. The paper explains the difference in outcomes (system change in Germany, retrenchment in Austria) by looking at the structure of political institutions. The federal government in Austria is much less constrained by formal veto players than the German government, which had to engage in extensive coalition-building to get the pension bill through the second chamber of parliament. Therefore the influence of informal veto players (mainly unions) was much higher in Germany. The impact on the reform outcome was the positive discrimination of occupational pensions and less severe cuts in the benefit levels. The concluding thesis is that for successful and long-term sustainable welfare state reform, a small number of formal veto players is a valuable resource. A large number of formal veto players is an obstacle to retrenchment reforms, although it might encourage policy innovation, because political actors will look for other policy venues to increase their leverage.</dcterms:abstract> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/13700"/> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dc:creator>Busemeyer, Marius R.</dc:creator> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:contributor>Busemeyer, Marius R.</dc:contributor> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-07-14T08:56:34Z</dc:date> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-07-14T08:56:34Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: West European Politics 28 (2005), 3, pp. 569-591</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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