How to Make Sense of Game Theory


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SPOHN, Wolfgang, 1982. How to Make Sense of Game Theory. In: STEGMÜLLER, W., ed. and others. Philosophy of economics : proceedings, Munich, July 1981. Berlin:Springer, pp. 239-270

@inproceedings{Spohn1982Sense-13671, title={How to Make Sense of Game Theory}, year={1982}, address={Berlin}, publisher={Springer}, booktitle={Philosophy of economics : proceedings, Munich, July 1981}, pages={239--270}, editor={Stegmüller, W.}, author={Spohn, Wolfgang}, note={Also publ. in: Discontents / Yanis Varoufakis (Ed.). - London [u.a.] : Routledge, 2001. - S. 213-241. - (Game theory ; 4)} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dspace="" xmlns:foaf="" xmlns:void="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource=""/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:alternative>Wie läßt sich die Spieltheorie verstehen</dcterms:alternative> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Philosophy of economics : proceedings, Munich, July 1981 / ed. by W. Stegmüller ... (eds.). Berlin : Springer, 1982, pp. 239-270.</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dc:creator>Spohn, Wolfgang</dc:creator> <dcterms:title>How to Make Sense of Game Theory</dcterms:title> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2011-08-24T07:39:06Z</dcterms:available> <dc:contributor>Spohn, Wolfgang</dc:contributor> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2011-08-24T07:39:06Z</dc:date> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:issued>1982</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The paper examines the extent to which game theory can be derived from a strictly Bayesian or decision theoretic point of view, since this is the only way to gain a unified theory of practical rationality. It observes that no such derivation exists and criticizes the standard arguments for the rationality of equilibrium strategies in two-person zero-sum games. It then proposes the beginnings of the theory or rationalizability (as it has been called later on) and observes its restrictions. It continues with pleading for a strict distinction of action rationality and epistemic rationality (which are confounded in game theory). The final critical discussion of Harsanyi's stance concludes that issues of epistemic rationality are independent and need to be explicitly considered in game theory and proposes to explain the subjective probabilities of the players, as they are assumed in game theory, as evolving in Bayesian game learning processes. (The postscript of the German version adds some comparative remarks on Skyrms' theory of practical deliberation.) [</dcterms:abstract> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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