Ordinal conditional functions : a dynamic theory of epistemic states


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SPOHN, Wolfgang, 1988. Ordinal conditional functions : a dynamic theory of epistemic states. In: WILLIAM L., Harper, ed. and others. Causation in decision, belief change, and statistics. Dordrecht:Kluwer, pp. 105-134

@inproceedings{Spohn1988Ordin-13661, title={Ordinal conditional functions : a dynamic theory of epistemic states}, year={1988}, number={2}, address={Dordrecht}, publisher={Kluwer}, series={Proceedings of the Irvine Conference on Probability and Causation}, booktitle={Causation in decision, belief change, and statistics}, pages={105--134}, editor={William L., Harper}, author={Spohn, Wolfgang} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/13661"> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:title>Ordinal conditional functions : a dynamic theory of epistemic states</dcterms:title> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/13661"/> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Causation in decision, belief change, and statistics / ed. by William L. Harper ... (Ed.). Dordrecht : Kluwer, 1988, pp. 105-134 (Proceedings of the Irvine Conference on Probability and Causation ; 2)</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dc:contributor>Spohn, Wolfgang</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Spohn, Wolfgang</dc:creator> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">It is natural and important to have a formal representation of plain belief, according to which propositions are held true, or held false, or neither. (In the paper this is called a deterministic representation of epistemic states). And it is of great philosophical importance to have a dynamic account of plain belief. AGM belief revision theory seems to provide such an account, but it founders at the problem of iterated belief revision, since it can generally account only for one step of revision. The paper discusses and rejects two solutions within the confines of AGM theory. It then introduces ranking functions (as I prefer to call them now; in the paper they are still called ordinal conditional functions) as the proper (and, I find, still the best) solution of the problem, proves that conditional independence w.r.t. ranking functions satisfies the so-called graphoid axioms, and proposes general rules of belief change (in close analogy to Jeffrey's generalized probabilistic conditionalization) that encompass revision and contraction as conceived in AGM theory. Indeed, the parallel to probability theory is amazing. Probability theory can profit from ranking theory as well since it is also plagued by the problem of iterated belief revision even if probability measures are conceived as Popper measures (see my paper “The Representation of Popper Measures”). Finally, the theory is compared with predecessors which are numerous and impressive, but somehow failed to explain the all-important conditional ranks in the appropriate way.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-10-11T06:33:58Z</dc:date> <dcterms:issued>1988</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-10-11T06:33:58Z</dcterms:available> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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