Gift exchange in the lab : it is not (only) how much you give ...

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ENGLMAIER, Florian, Steve LEIDER, 2010. Gift exchange in the lab : it is not (only) how much you give ...

@techreport{Englmaier2010excha-13486, series={CESifo Working Papers;2944}, title={Gift exchange in the lab : it is not (only) how much you give ...}, year={2010}, author={Englmaier, Florian and Leider, Steve} }

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