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Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave

Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave

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ENGLMAIER, Florian, Gerd MUEHLHEUSSER, Andreas ROIDER, 2010. Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave

@techreport{Englmaier2010Optim-13485, series={IZA Discussion Paper Series;5027}, title={Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave}, year={2010}, author={Englmaier, Florian and Muehlheusser, Gerd and Roider, Andreas} }

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