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Type of Publication: | Journal article |
Publication status: | Published |
Author: | Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Stephen |
Year of publication: | 2012 |
Published in: | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics ; 4 (2012), 2. - pp. 146-183. - American Economic Association (AEA). - ISSN 1945-7669. - eISSN 1945-7685 |
URL of original publication: | https://www.jstor.org/stable/23249437, Last access on Apr 22, 2020 |
DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.4.2.146 |
Summary: |
We solve for the optimal contract when agents are reciprocal, demonstrating that generous compensation can substitute for performance-based pay. Our results suggest several factors that make firms more likely to use reciprocal incentives. Reciprocity is most powerful when output is a poor signal of effort and when the agent is highly reciprocal and/or productive. Similarly, reciprocal incentives are attractive when firm managers have strong incentive pay and discretion over employee compensation. While reciprocal incentives can be optimal even when identical firms compete, a reciprocity contract is most likely when one firm has a match-specific productivity advantage with the agent.
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JEL Classification: | D82 , J33 , M52; D23; M12 |
Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
Refereed: | Yes |
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ENGLMAIER, Florian, Stephen LEIDER, 2012. Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents. In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. American Economic Association (AEA). 4(2), pp. 146-183. ISSN 1945-7669. eISSN 1945-7685. Available under: doi: 10.1257/mic.4.2.146
@article{Englmaier2012Contr-13484.2, title={Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents}, url={https://www.jstor.org/stable/23249437}, year={2012}, doi={10.1257/mic.4.2.146}, number={2}, volume={4}, issn={1945-7669}, journal={American Economic Journal: Microeconomics}, pages={146--183}, author={Englmaier, Florian and Leider, Stephen} }
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