Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents

Cite This

Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

ENGLMAIER, Florian, Stephen LEIDER, 2012. Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents. In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. American Economic Association (AEA). 4(2), pp. 146-183. ISSN 1945-7669. eISSN 1945-7685. Available under: doi: 10.1257/mic.4.2.146

@article{Englmaier2012Contr-13484.2, title={Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents}, url={https://www.jstor.org/stable/23249437}, year={2012}, doi={10.1257/mic.4.2.146}, number={2}, volume={4}, issn={1945-7669}, journal={American Economic Journal: Microeconomics}, pages={146--183}, author={Englmaier, Florian and Leider, Stephen} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/13484.2"> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-04-22T12:42:05Z</dc:date> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:contributor>Leider, Stephen</dc:contributor> <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:creator>Englmaier, Florian</dc:creator> <dcterms:title>Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents</dcterms:title> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/13484.2"/> <dc:creator>Leider, Stephen</dc:creator> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We solve for the optimal contract when agents are reciprocal, demonstrating that generous compensation can substitute for performance-based pay. Our results suggest several factors that make firms more likely to use reciprocal incentives. Reciprocity is most powerful when output is a poor signal of effort and when the agent is highly reciprocal and/or productive. Similarly, reciprocal incentives are attractive when firm managers have strong incentive pay and discretion over employee compensation. While reciprocal incentives can be optimal even when identical firms compete, a reciprocity contract is most likely when one firm has a match-specific productivity advantage with the agent.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dc:contributor>Englmaier, Florian</dc:contributor> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-04-22T12:42:05Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Version History

Version Item Date Summary Publication Version

*Selected version

Search KOPS


Browse

My Account