Contractual and organizational structure with reciprocal agents

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ENGLMAIER, Florian, Stephen LEIDER, 2008. Contractual and organizational structure with reciprocal agents

@techreport{Englmaier2008Contr-13484, series={CESifo working papers;2415}, title={Contractual and organizational structure with reciprocal agents}, year={2008}, author={Englmaier, Florian and Leider, Stephen} }

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