Political cycles in active labor market policies

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MECHTEL, Mario, Niklas POTRAFKE, 2009. Political cycles in active labor market policies

@techreport{Mechtel2009Polit-13441, series={MPRA Paper ; 14270}, title={Political cycles in active labor market policies}, year={2009}, author={Mechtel, Mario and Potrafke, Niklas} }

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