Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion

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ENGLMAIER, Florian, Achim WAMBACH, 2010. Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 69(2), pp. 312-328. ISSN 0899-8256. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.007

@article{Englmaier2010Optim-12712, title={Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion}, year={2010}, doi={10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.007}, number={2}, volume={69}, issn={0899-8256}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, pages={312--328}, author={Englmaier, Florian and Wambach, Achim} }

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