Product liability and the virtues of asymmetric information

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BAUMANN, Florian, Tim FRIEHE, 2010. Product liability and the virtues of asymmetric information. In: Journal of Economics. 100(1), pp. 19-32. ISSN 0931-8658. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00712-010-0123-6

@article{Baumann2010Produ-12682, title={Product liability and the virtues of asymmetric information}, year={2010}, doi={10.1007/s00712-010-0123-6}, number={1}, volume={100}, issn={0931-8658}, journal={Journal of Economics}, pages={19--32}, author={Baumann, Florian and Friehe, Tim} }

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