Aid effectiveness and limited enforceable conditionality

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SCHOLL, Almuth, 2009. Aid effectiveness and limited enforceable conditionality. In: Review of Economic Dynamics. 12(2), pp. 377-391. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.red.2008.09.005

@article{Scholl2009effec-12276, title={Aid effectiveness and limited enforceable conditionality}, year={2009}, doi={10.1016/j.red.2008.09.005}, number={2}, volume={12}, journal={Review of Economic Dynamics}, pages={377--391}, author={Scholl, Almuth} }

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