KOPS - The Institutional Repository of the University of Konstanz

On "Golden Parachutes" as Manager Discipline Devices in Takeover Contests

On "Golden Parachutes" as Manager Discipline Devices in Takeover Contests

Cite This

Files in this item

Checksum: MD5:ce60005bf12cc053d0f0952b23aa0e0a

FABEL, Oliver, Martin KOLMAR, 2007. On "Golden Parachutes" as Manager Discipline Devices in Takeover Contests

@techreport{Fabel2007Golde-12242, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={On "Golden Parachutes" as Manager Discipline Devices in Takeover Contests}, year={2007}, number={17}, author={Fabel, Oliver and Kolmar, Martin} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/12242"> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:title>On "Golden Parachutes" as Manager Discipline Devices in Takeover Contests</dcterms:title> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/12242/1/TWI_res17.pdf"/> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/12242/1/TWI_res17.pdf"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:43:44Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/legalcode"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The effect of severance pay on management behavior during a takeover battle is generally ambiguous. Yet, the severance payment completely restraining all influence activities always constitutes a golden parachute. The manager leaving office still benefits from the increase in the merged firm s total value. Moreover, given that managers are compensated according to an identical scheme, the optimal shareholder policy always entails a corner solution. Managers will either receive no severance pay, or the payment will be chosen such that their influence activities equal zero. Relatively strong incentive intensities and low synergy gains then imply that offering no severance pay dominates.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:contributor>Kolmar, Martin</dc:contributor> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:issued>2007</dcterms:issued> <dc:creator>Fabel, Oliver</dc:creator> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dc:contributor>Fabel, Oliver</dc:contributor> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/12242"/> <dc:creator>Kolmar, Martin</dc:creator> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:43:44Z</dc:date> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Downloads since Oct 1, 2014 (Information about access statistics)

TWI_res17.pdf 208

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

terms-of-use Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as terms-of-use

Search KOPS


Browse

My Account