Productive government spending, growth, and sequential voting


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KAAS, Leo, 2003. Productive government spending, growth, and sequential voting. In: European Journal of Political Economy. 19(2), pp. 227-246

@article{Kaas2003Produ-12136, title={Productive government spending, growth, and sequential voting}, year={2003}, doi={10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00168-4}, number={2}, volume={19}, journal={European Journal of Political Economy}, pages={227--246}, author={Kaas, Leo} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dcterms:issued>2003</dcterms:issued> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2011-03-25T09:42:55Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper considers an endogenous growth model with productive government spending in which overlapping generations of agents vote sequentially on policy. With sequential majority voting, there is a multiplicity of politico-economic equilibria originating from self-fulfilling policy expectations. Some of these equilibria are Pareto-inefficient and there are endogenous cycles. A constitutional rule providing partial commitment significantly shrinks the set of politico-economic equilibria, removing all inefficiencies and cycles. However, a likely outcome is that government size is too high relative to the growth maximizing size.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:creator>Kaas, Leo</dc:creator> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dc:contributor>Kaas, Leo</dc:contributor> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2011-03-25T09:42:55Z</dc:date> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> <dcterms:title>Productive government spending, growth, and sequential voting</dcterms:title> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: European Journal of Political Economy, 19 (2003), 2, pp. 227-246</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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