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Recruitment of Overeducated Personnel : Insider-Outsider Effects on Fair Employee Selection Practices

Recruitment of Overeducated Personnel : Insider-Outsider Effects on Fair Employee Selection Practices

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FABEL, Oliver, Razvan PASCALAU, 2007. Recruitment of Overeducated Personnel : Insider-Outsider Effects on Fair Employee Selection Practices

@techreport{Fabel2007Recru-12127, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={Recruitment of Overeducated Personnel : Insider-Outsider Effects on Fair Employee Selection Practices}, year={2007}, number={18}, author={Fabel, Oliver and Pascalau, Razvan} }

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