The Impact of Law Enforcement Design on Legal Compliance

Zitieren

Dateien zu dieser Ressource

Prüfsumme: MD5:fe2d77fd5e7a70c184f09bcb0b54f2d6

BRUTTEL, Lisa, Tim FRIEHE, 2010. The Impact of Law Enforcement Design on Legal Compliance

@techreport{Bruttel2010Impac-12097, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={The Impact of Law Enforcement Design on Legal Compliance}, year={2010}, number={50}, author={Bruttel, Lisa and Friehe, Tim} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/12097"> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/12097/1/TWI_RPS_050_Bruttel_Friehe_2010_05_01.pdf"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/legalcode"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:title>The Impact of Law Enforcement Design on Legal Compliance</dcterms:title> <dc:contributor>Friehe, Tim</dc:contributor> <dcterms:issued>2010</dcterms:issued> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:42:39Z</dc:date> <dc:creator>Bruttel, Lisa</dc:creator> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:42:39Z</dcterms:available> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper presents experimental evidence on the way in which the design of law enforcement impacts legal compliance. The experiment includes two law enforcement designs: one in which sanctioning results in victim-compensation and one in which sanctions are rent-seeking devices for the enforcer. We show that in the rent-seeking design (i) potential violators choose non-compliance more often and (ii) the average violator tries to avoid detection less aggressively.</dcterms:abstract> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/12097"/> <dc:creator>Friehe, Tim</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Bruttel, Lisa</dc:contributor> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/12097/1/TWI_RPS_050_Bruttel_Friehe_2010_05_01.pdf"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Dateiabrufe seit 01.10.2014 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

TWI_RPS_050_Bruttel_Friehe_2010_05_01.pdf 79

Das Dokument erscheint in:

deposit-license Solange nicht anders angezeigt, wird die Lizenz wie folgt beschrieben: deposit-license

KOPS Suche


Stöbern

Mein Benutzerkonto