Horizontal and vertical social preferences in tournaments

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EISENKOPF, Gerald, Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2009. Horizontal and vertical social preferences in tournaments

@techreport{Eisenkopf2009Horiz-12063, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={Horizontal and vertical social preferences in tournaments}, year={2009}, number={48}, author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Teyssier, Sabrina} }

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