Why Green Parties Should Fear Successful International Climate Agreements

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LAURENCY, Patrick, Dirk SCHINDLER, 2010. Why Green Parties Should Fear Successful International Climate Agreements

@techreport{Laurency2010Green-12014, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={Why Green Parties Should Fear Successful International Climate Agreements}, year={2010}, number={56}, author={Laurency, Patrick and Schindler, Dirk} }

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