Fiscal Federalism, Citizen-Candidate Mobility and Political Competition

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NASTASSINE, Stanislav, 2005. Fiscal Federalism, Citizen-Candidate Mobility and Political Competition [Dissertation]. Konstanz: University of Konstanz

@phdthesis{Nastassine2005Fisca-11998, title={Fiscal Federalism, Citizen-Candidate Mobility and Political Competition}, year={2005}, author={Nastassine, Stanislav}, address={Konstanz}, school={Universität Konstanz} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dspace="" xmlns:foaf="" xmlns:void="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:title>Fiscal Federalism, Citizen-Candidate Mobility and Political Competition</dcterms:title> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dc:creator>Nastassine, Stanislav</dc:creator> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource=""/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2011-03-25T09:41:38Z</dc:date> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:contributor>Nastassine, Stanislav</dc:contributor> <dcterms:issued>2005</dcterms:issued> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This work consists of two parts. In the first part I analyze the influence of personal mobility on the citizens' willingness to run for a political office in their municipality and on the resulting local policy outcome. The model portrays heterogeneous policy preferences that are coupled with different exogenous degrees of interjurisdictional mobility. I show that an increase in mobility can be liable to shift the policy outcome towards the preferred policy of the less mobile citizens. I thus identify an endogenous policy response to personal mobility diametrically opposed to the tax competition effect that has hitherto dominated the discussion of the political consequences of personal mobility. In the second part I develop a model of political yardstick competition in federal states. As a benchmark I use the Besley and Smart (2002) model that focuses on horizontal yardstick competition between province governors. In my model I introduce the federal level of government in order to analyze the additional, vertical, contest that arises if governors not only compete for re-election but also for the presidency. The main result of the analysis is that in a fully-fledged federal system admitting vertical competition new equilibria emerge in which unprincipled governors do not extract any rents from the general public. It thus transpires that federalism is an institution that reduces government appropriation.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:alternative>Fiskalischer Föderalismus, Citizen-Candidate-Mobilität und politischer Wettbewerb</dcterms:alternative> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2011-03-25T09:41:38Z</dcterms:available> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource=""/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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