Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

Lade...
Vorschaubild
Dateien
Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.
Datum
2009
Autor:innen
Engelmann, Dirk
Herausgeber:innen
Kontakt
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
ArXiv-ID
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Gesperrt bis
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Forschungsvorhaben
Organisationseinheiten
Zeitschriftenheft
Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Games and Economic Behavior. Elsevier. 2009, 67(2), pp. 399-407. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006
Zusammenfassung

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially affected by strategic considerations. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
004 Informatik
Schlagwörter
Indirect reciprocity, Reputation, Experimental economics
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690ENGELMANN, Dirk, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2009. Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game. In: Games and Economic Behavior. Elsevier. 2009, 67(2), pp. 399-407. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006
BibTex
@article{Engelmann2009Indir-11986.2,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006},
  title={Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game},
  number={2},
  volume={67},
  issn={0899-8256},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  pages={399--407},
  author={Engelmann, Dirk and Fischbacher, Urs}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/11986.2">
    <dc:contributor>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:creator>Engelmann, Dirk</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2022-07-26T09:37:29Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:creator>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially affected by strategic considerations. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/11986.2/1/Engelmann_2-5542tt2vtb936.pdf"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11986.2"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2009</dcterms:issued>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/11986.2/1/Engelmann_2-5542tt2vtb936.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2022-07-26T09:37:29Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:contributor>Engelmann, Dirk</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dcterms:title>Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game</dcterms:title>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.
Prüfdatum der URL
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Ja
Diese Publikation teilen

Versionsgeschichte

Gerade angezeigt 1 - 2 von 2
VersionDatumZusammenfassung
2*
2022-07-26 09:31:16
2011-03-25 09:41:34
* Ausgewählte Version