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Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

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ENGELMANN, Dirk, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2009. Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game. In: Games and Economic Behavior. Elsevier. 67(2), pp. 399-407. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006

@article{Engelmann2009Indir-11986.2, title={Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game}, year={2009}, doi={10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006}, number={2}, volume={67}, issn={0899-8256}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, pages={399--407}, author={Engelmann, Dirk and Fischbacher, Urs} }

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