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Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

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Prüfsumme: MD5:66f065d55de585ce720111215f7ed76f

ENGELMANN, Dirk, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2008. Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

@techreport{Engelmann2008Indir-11986, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game}, year={2008}, number={34}, author={Engelmann, Dirk and Fischbacher, Urs} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/11986"> <dcterms:issued>2008</dcterms:issued> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11986"/> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:41:34Z</dc:date> <dc:contributor>Engelmann, Dirk</dc:contributor> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103416863-3868037-7"/> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dcterms:title>Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game</dcterms:title> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:creator>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:contributor> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially a!ected by strategic considerations. We find that the behavioral pattern can best be captured by non-selfish preferences as assumed by reciprocity models. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:41:34Z</dcterms:available> <dc:creator>Engelmann, Dirk</dc:creator> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Dateiabrufe seit 01.10.2014 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

56_No34_08_08_TWI_RPS_Engelmann_Fischbacher.pdf 656

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