Tracking and Incentives: A comment on Hanushek and Woessmann

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EISENKOPF, Gerald, 2007. Tracking and Incentives: A comment on Hanushek and Woessmann

@techreport{Eisenkopf2007Track-11943, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={Tracking and Incentives: A comment on Hanushek and Woessmann}, year={2007}, number={22}, author={Eisenkopf, Gerald} }

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