Experimental evidence on the appropriateness of non-monotone incentive contracts

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BROSIG, Jeannette, Christian LUKAS, 2006. Experimental evidence on the appropriateness of non-monotone incentive contracts

@techreport{Brosig2006Exper-11891, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={Experimental evidence on the appropriateness of non-monotone incentive contracts}, year={2006}, number={15}, author={Brosig, Jeannette and Lukas, Christian} }

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TWI_Res_15.pdf 189

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