On the Evolution of Market Institutions : The Platform Design Paradox

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ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Georg KIRCHSTEIGER, Markus WALZL, 2010. On the Evolution of Market Institutions : The Platform Design Paradox. In: The Economic Journal. 120(543), pp. 215-243

@article{Alos-Ferrer2010Evolu-11887, title={On the Evolution of Market Institutions : The Platform Design Paradox}, year={2010}, doi={10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02297.x}, number={543}, volume={120}, journal={The Economic Journal}, pages={215--243}, author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Kirchsteiger, Georg and Walzl, Markus} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/11887"> <dc:contributor>Walzl, Markus</dc:contributor> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: The Economic Journal 120 (2010), 543, pp. 215-243</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dc:contributor>Kirchsteiger, Georg</dc:contributor> <dc:contributor>Alós-Ferrer, Carlos</dc:contributor> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11887"/> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> <dc:creator>Alós-Ferrer, Carlos</dc:creator> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:40:54Z</dc:date> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103416863-3868037-7"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether Walrasian platforms, leading to market-clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers compete, we find that traders learn to select non-market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market-clearing level, provided at least one such platform is introduced by a market designer. This in turn leads market designers to introduce non-market clearing platforms. Hence platform competition induces non-competitive market outcomes.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:title>On the Evolution of Market Institutions : The Platform Design Paradox</dcterms:title> <dc:creator>Walzl, Markus</dc:creator> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dcterms:issued>2010</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-05-03T08:53:15Z</dcterms:available> <dc:creator>Kirchsteiger, Georg</dc:creator> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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