Envy and loss aversion in tournaments

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EISENKOPF, Gerald, Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2013. Envy and loss aversion in tournaments. In: Journal of Economic Psychology. 34, pp. 240-255. ISSN 0167-4870. eISSN 1872-7719. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.06.006

@article{Eisenkopf2013avers-11885.2, title={Envy and loss aversion in tournaments}, year={2013}, doi={10.1016/j.joep.2012.06.006}, volume={34}, issn={0167-4870}, journal={Journal of Economic Psychology}, pages={240--255}, author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Teyssier, Sabrina} }

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