Capital Tax Competition with Inefficient Government Spending

Eggert, Wolfgang

Capital Tax Competition with Inefficient Government Spending

Dateien

422_1.pdfGröße: 209.3 KBDownloads: 1292

Datum

1999

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

Models of international tax competition typically assume the existence of a benevolent government. This paper presents a model which integrates the view of government as source of inefficiency with an analysis of distorting taxes on capital investment, savings and labor income in a common theoretical framework. The model yields the conclusion that the effects of international tax coordination on the welfare of residents can be ambiguous because the costs of inefficient public good supply are lowered but wasteful government consumption increased. However, the above finding is derived when the residence-based capital tax is not available. In contrast, government use of taxes clearly is inefficient from the viewpoint of residents in the presence of residence-based capital taxation.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

ISO 690

EGGERT, Wolfgang, 1999. Capital Tax Competition with Inefficient Government Spending

BibTex

@techreport{Eggert1999Capit-11846,
  year={1999},
  series={CoFE-Diskussionspapiere / Zentrum für Finanzen und Ökonometrie},
  title={Capital Tax Competition with Inefficient Government Spending},
  number={1999/15},
  author={Eggert, Wolfgang}
}

RDF

<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/11846">
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/11846/1/422_1.pdf"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:40:38Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Models of international tax competition typically assume the existence of a benevolent government. This paper presents a model which integrates the view of government as source of inefficiency with an analysis of distorting taxes on capital investment, savings and labor income in a common theoretical framework. The model yields the conclusion that the effects of international tax coordination on the welfare of residents can be ambiguous because the costs of inefficient public good supply are lowered but wasteful government consumption increased. However, the above finding is derived when the residence-based capital tax is not available. In contrast, government use of taxes clearly is inefficient from the viewpoint of residents in the presence of residence-based capital taxation.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11846"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/11846/1/422_1.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:40:38Z</dcterms:available>
    <dcterms:title>Capital Tax Competition with Inefficient Government Spending</dcterms:title>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
    <dc:creator>Eggert, Wolfgang</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:issued>1999</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:contributor>Eggert, Wolfgang</dc:contributor>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Universitätsbibliographie

Nein