Capital Tax Competition with Inefficient Government Spending

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EGGERT, Wolfgang, 1999. Capital Tax Competition with Inefficient Government Spending

@techreport{Eggert1999Capit-11846, series={CoFE-Diskussionspapiere / Zentrum für Finanzen und Ökonometrie}, title={Capital Tax Competition with Inefficient Government Spending}, year={1999}, number={1999/15}, author={Eggert, Wolfgang} }

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