Credit And Growth Under Limited Commitment

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AZARIADIS, Costas, Leo KAAS, 2008. Credit And Growth Under Limited Commitment. In: Macroeconomic Dynamics. 12(Supplement S1), pp. 20-30. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S136510050707006X

@article{Azariadis2008Credi-11838, title={Credit And Growth Under Limited Commitment}, year={2008}, doi={10.1017/S136510050707006X}, number={Supplement S1}, volume={12}, journal={Macroeconomic Dynamics}, pages={20--30}, author={Azariadis, Costas and Kaas, Leo} }

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