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On the Desirability of Taxing Capital Income to Reduce Moral Hazard in Social Insurance

On the Desirability of Taxing Capital Income to Reduce Moral Hazard in Social Insurance

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JACOBS, Bas, Dirk SCHINDLER, 2009. On the Desirability of Taxing Capital Income to Reduce Moral Hazard in Social Insurance

@techreport{Jacobs2009Desir-11797, title={On the Desirability of Taxing Capital Income to Reduce Moral Hazard in Social Insurance}, year={2009}, author={Jacobs, Bas and Schindler, Dirk}, note={First publ. as: CESifo Working Paper, No. 2806, 2009} }

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