The political economy of child labor

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MAFFEI, Alessandro, 2005. The political economy of child labor

@phdthesis{Maffei2005polit-11763, title={The political economy of child labor}, year={2005}, author={Maffei, Alessandro}, address={Konstanz}, school={Universität Konstanz} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/11763"> <dc:creator>Maffei, Alessandro</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Maffei, Alessandro</dc:contributor> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11763"/> <dcterms:alternative>Die politische Ökonomie der Kinderarbeit</dcterms:alternative> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:40:06Z</dcterms:available> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> <dcterms:issued>2005</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The phenomenon of child labor is widespread in developing countries and emotionally discussed in the media and public. At present there is a well-developed and fast growing economic literature on child labor which covers the various aspects of child labor. In the first part of the thesis we give a survey about the facts, the institutions and the economic literature dealing with child labor. The economic theory of child labor can be roughly subdivided into the economic theory of child labor in closed and open economies respectively. Summed up, the literature on the normative theory of child labor in closed economies suggests that child labor policies could enhance welfare from a country s point of view but nevertheless many sectors in developing countries are characterized by exploitative child labor even though it is forbidden by law. The question arises why politicians who are supposed to be concerned with social welfare do not combat child labor more severely when the abolition of child labor would be welfare enhancing. In order to answer this question we develop and test in the second part of the thesis a political-economic model that explains lenient enforcement of existing child labor legislation. Assuming a closed-economy overlapping generations model with skilled and unskilled workers, we show that autocratic governments captured by a skilled elite are not interested in enforcing child labor legislation. The reason is an increase in the supply of skilled labor which would lower the wage rate of the ruling skilled elite. The implication of the economic theory of child labor in open economies is that even if international child labor standards do improve world welfare, trade policies will not be the first best measures to enforce these standards even though it is advocated by developed countries . We address this question by developing in the third part of the thesis a political-economic model where a contingent punitive tariff is determined endogenously in a developed country in which child labor does not exist. The contingent punitive tariff is imposed on imports from a developing country if the exporting firm is detected or convicted of using child labor. We find that lobbying of domestic firms and false altruism of domestic consumers may prevent the domestic government from implementing the first best policy.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103416863-3868037-7"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-25T09:40:06Z</dc:date> <dcterms:title>The political economy of child labor</dcterms:title> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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