Publikation:

The Dose Does it : Punishment and Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good Games

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Datum

2019

Autor:innen

Rockenbach, Bettina

Herausgeber:innen

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URI (zitierfähiger Link)
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-6kbeoa753gj47
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000084
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Open Access Green

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Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
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Published

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Review of Behavioral Economics. 2019, 6(1), pp. 19-37. ISSN 2326-6198. eISSN 2326-6201. Available under: doi: 10.1561/105.00000084

Zusammenfassung

We experimentally study the role of punishment for cooperation in dynamic public-good problems where past payoffs determine present contribution capabilities. The beneficial role of punishment possibilities for cooperation is fragile: successful cooperation hinges on the presence of a common understanding of how punishment should be used. If high-contributors punish too readily, the group likely gets on a wasteful path of punishment and retaliation. If punishment is administered more patiently, even initially uncooperative groups thrive. Hence, when today’s punishment also determines tomorrow’s cooperation abilities, it seems crucial that groups agree on the right ‘dose’ of sanctions for punishment to support cooperation.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Cooperation, Dynamic game, Punishment, Retaliation, Endowment endogeneity, Experiment

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ISO 690ROCKENBACH, Bettina, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2019. The Dose Does it : Punishment and Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good Games. In: Review of Behavioral Economics. 2019, 6(1), pp. 19-37. ISSN 2326-6198. eISSN 2326-6201. Available under: doi: 10.1561/105.00000084
BibTex
@article{Rockenbach2019Punis-46606,
  year={2019},
  doi={10.1561/105.00000084},
  title={The Dose Does it : Punishment and Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good Games},
  number={1},
  volume={6},
  issn={2326-6198},
  journal={Review of Behavioral Economics},
  pages={19--37},
  author={Rockenbach, Bettina and Wolff, Irenaeus}
}
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