Publikation:

On the Evolution of Market Institutions : The Platform Design Paradox

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2010

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Kirchsteiger, Georg
Walzl, Markus

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-127581
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02297.x
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The Economic Journal. 2010, 120(543), pp. 215-243. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02297.x

Zusammenfassung

We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether Walrasian platforms, leading to market-clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers compete, we find that traders learn to select non-market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market-clearing level, provided at least one such platform is introduced by a market designer. This in turn leads market designers to introduce non-market clearing platforms. Hence platform competition induces non-competitive market outcomes.

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330 Wirtschaft

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ISO 690ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Georg KIRCHSTEIGER, Markus WALZL, 2010. On the Evolution of Market Institutions : The Platform Design Paradox. In: The Economic Journal. 2010, 120(543), pp. 215-243. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02297.x
BibTex
@article{AlosFerrer2010Evolu-11887,
  year={2010},
  doi={10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02297.x},
  title={On the Evolution of Market Institutions : The Platform Design Paradox},
  number={543},
  volume={120},
  journal={The Economic Journal},
  pages={215--243},
  author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Kirchsteiger, Georg and Walzl, Markus}
}
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