Publikation:

Excess Entry in an Experimental Winner-Take-All Market

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2008

Autor:innen

Thöni, Christian

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-94305
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.05.018
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Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2008, 67(1), pp. 150-163. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.05.018

Zusammenfassung

"Winner-take-all" markets (i.e., markets in which the relative and not the absolute performance is decisive) have gained in importance. Such markets have a tendency to provoke inefficiently many entries. We investigate such markets in an experiment and show that there are even more inefficient entries than predicted by the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, this effect increases with group size. Quantal response equilibrium predicts the increase in group size but fails to predict the excess entry in the smaller group. We show that the excess entry is not caused by coordination failures. Furthermore, individual entry behavior is not significantly linked to risk preferences.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Winner-take-all market, Excess entry Experiment, Market entry

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ISO 690FISCHBACHER, Urs, Christian THÖNI, 2008. Excess Entry in an Experimental Winner-Take-All Market. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2008, 67(1), pp. 150-163. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.05.018
BibTex
@article{Fischbacher2008Exces-1860,
  year={2008},
  doi={10.1016/j.jebo.2006.05.018},
  title={Excess Entry in an Experimental Winner-Take-All Market},
  number={1},
  volume={67},
  journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
  pages={150--163},
  author={Fischbacher, Urs and Thöni, Christian}
}
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