Publikation: Implementing the commitment solution via discretionary policy-making
Dateien
Datum
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Link zur Lizenz
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Sammlungen
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Publikationsstatus
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung
This paper demonstrates that, in a large class of linear-quadratic models with rational expectations, losses due to time-inconsistency problems can be avoided, as the commitment solution can be implemented by a policy-maker who acts under discretion. We focus on two approaches. First, we show that a non-Markovian, reputational equilibrium that implements the commitment solution always exists. Second, we show how delegation to a policy-maker with an additional objective for the policy instrument can be used to implement the commitment solution via a standard discretionary Markov equilibrium. Implementation is facilitated by the fact that the commitment outcome can be attained irrespective of the weight that the policy-maker assigns to the additional target. Using the standard new Keynesian model as an example, we study the dynamics of the economy under optimal additional output targets as well as optimal interest-rate targets for central banks.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
Zitieren
ISO 690
HAHN, Volker, 2023. Implementing the commitment solution via discretionary policy-making. In: Macroeconomic Dynamics. Cambridge University Press. 2023, 27(7), pp. 1866-1892. ISSN 1365-1005. eISSN 1469-8056. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S1365100522000499BibTex
@article{Hahn2023Imple-58991, year={2023}, doi={10.1017/S1365100522000499}, title={Implementing the commitment solution via discretionary policy-making}, number={7}, volume={27}, issn={1365-1005}, journal={Macroeconomic Dynamics}, pages={1866--1892}, author={Hahn, Volker} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/58991"> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:contributor>Hahn, Volker</dc:contributor> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/58991/1/Hahn_2-ad74a0yvz1he8.pdf"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper demonstrates that, in a large class of linear-quadratic models with rational expectations, losses due to time-inconsistency problems can be avoided, as the commitment solution can be implemented by a policy-maker who acts under discretion. We focus on two approaches. First, we show that a non-Markovian, reputational equilibrium that implements the commitment solution always exists. Second, we show how delegation to a policy-maker with an additional objective for the policy instrument can be used to implement the commitment solution via a standard discretionary Markov equilibrium. Implementation is facilitated by the fact that the commitment outcome can be attained irrespective of the weight that the policy-maker assigns to the additional target. Using the standard new Keynesian model as an example, we study the dynamics of the economy under optimal additional output targets as well as optimal interest-rate targets for central banks.</dcterms:abstract> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:issued>2023</dcterms:issued> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/58991"/> <dc:creator>Hahn, Volker</dc:creator> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:title>Implementing the commitment solution via discretionary policy-making</dcterms:title> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2022-11-02T07:50:41Z</dc:date> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2022-11-02T07:50:41Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/58991/1/Hahn_2-ad74a0yvz1he8.pdf"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>